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LEGITIMIZING ERROR 
Rebecca E. Woodman* †
Since Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court has sought to harmonize 
competing constitutional demands under Eighth Amendment rules regulat-
ing the two-step eligibility and selection stages of the capital decision-
making process. Furman’s demand for rationality and consistency requires 
that, at the eligibility stage, the sentencer’s discretion be limited and guided 
by clear and objective fact-based standards that rationally narrow the class 
of death-eligible defendants. The selection stage requires a determination of 
whether a specific death-eligible defendant actually deserves that punish-
ment, as distinguished from other death-eligible defendants. Here, 
fundamental fairness and respect for the uniqueness of the individual are the 
cornerstones of the individualized sentencing requirements, which demand 
the sentencer consider and give effect to relevant mitigating evidence. The 
principles embodied in the individualized sentencing determination, as 
stated in Lockett v. Ohio, are rooted in the “fundamental respect for human-
ity underlying the Eighth Amendment.” In Woodson v. North Carolina, the 
Court recognized that, because “death is different” from all other punish-
ments, the Eighth Amendment requires a heightened degree of “reliability in 
the determination that death is an appropriate punishment in a specific 
case.” 
Though both constitutional demands are aimed at ensuring that state 
capital-sentencing procedures comply with Furman’s demand to eliminate 
the wanton and freakish infliction of the death penalty, there is an unmistak-
able—and oft-discussed—tension between them. While the demand for 
rationality and reliability at the eligibility stage places limits on the sen-
tencer’s discretion, the demand for fairness and respect for the individual at 
the selection stage requires an expanded discretion and the authority to dis-
pense mercy based on mitigating evidence. 
The Court’s efforts to balance these demands have been difficult. Justice 
Blackmun, in his famous dissent in Callins v. Collins, withdrew from the 
effort altogether, and announced that he would no longer “tinker with the 
machinery of death.” Justice Scalia, responding to Justice Blackmun in his 
concurrence in Callins, took another tack, and repeated his announcement 
four years earlier in Walton v. Arizona, that he would not enforce the re-
quirements of the individualized sentencing determination because, in his 
view, there was no basis for it in the text of the Eighth Amendment. Justice 
Scalia reiterated that position in his concurring opinion in Kansas v. Marsh. 
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Justice Thomas concludes for the majority that the Kansas statute con-
tains the structural form of both narrowing and individualized sentencing. 
We never disputed that the Kansas statute satisfies the Eighth Amendment 
narrowing requirement at the eligibility stage, since the jury must find the 
existence of at least one aggravating factor before a defendant becomes 
But the rules regulating the capital decision-making process—
particularly those governing the individualized sentencing determination—
are designed to minimize the risk of error in sentencing a person to death. 
Thus, despite the natural tension between the competing constitutional de-
mands at the eligibility and selection stages, the Court (except for Justice 
Scalia) has remained faithful to the effort to harmonize them, at least in 
form, if not always in substance. Until now. 
I always thought that if there ever was a capital sentencing formula in 
which the constitutional demands of individualized sentencing could not be 
met, even in form, the Kansas statutory formula was it. How could a statu-
tory scheme requiring death if the jury finds that the aggravating and 
mitigating factors are in equipoise possibly ensure a reliable determination 
that death is an appropriate punishment for an individual offender? Even if 
the jury’s finding of equipoise is beyond a reasonable doubt, the resulting 
death sentence does not fulfill the requirements for individualized sentenc-
ing. Equipoise indicates only that the jury is unable to reach a conclusion 
whether the balance of aggravation and mitigation does or does not make 
the individual defendant worthy of death. A death sentence based on equi-
poise says nothing about a particular individual except that he or she is 
among the class of death-eligible defendants. The decision constitutionally 
required by the jury at the selection stage is left unfulfilled. 
At the outset, the Court’s treatment of the merits is puzzling, even apart 
from the well-publicized fireworks it sparked between Justice Scalia and 
Justice Souter. If—as the majority in Marsh contends—Walton v. Arizona is 
controlling authority on the constitutionality of the Kansas statute, why 
didn’t the Court just reverse based on Walton and be done with it? But Jus-
tice Thomas, writing for the majority, hedges on Walton’s dispositive effect, 
and is compelled to justify the decision as if “Walton [did] not directly con-
trol.” Whether this indicates a lack of confidence in Walton’s real value as 
stare decisis in this case remains unexplained.  
I have never believed Walton to be controlling on the equipoise issue. As 
both Justice Stevens and Justice Souter separately point out in Marsh, the 
Walton plurality never addressed the equipoise issue, and certainly avoided 
endorsing a rule which would require death if the aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances are equally balanced. (In fact, Arizona law requires that 
“doubtful cases” will be resolved in favor of life; the precise opposite of the 
Kansas law.) Justice Blackmun, who truly believed that the Arizona law did 
present an equipoise problem, wrote extensively in his dissent in Walton to 
point out that the plurality did not address the issue. The Marsh majority’s 
reliance on Justice Blackmun’s dissent as a basis for asserting that the equi-
poise issue was “resolved” by the plurality’s holding in Walton, therefore, is 
tenuous. 
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The Marsh majority opinion further justifies the Kansas statute as “ana-
lytically indistinguishable” from the capital sentencing structures approved 
by the Court in Blystone v. Pennsylvania and Boyde v. California. Both 
cases involved formulas that mandate death upon a jury finding that aggra-
vating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. In response to 
death-eligible. Justice Thomas then suggests that the Kansas procedure con-
forms to the individualized sentencing requirement because “a Kansas jury 
is permitted to consider any evidence relating to any mitigating circum-
stance in determining the appropriate sentence for a capital defendant, so 
long as that evidence is relevant.”  
It is here that the majority opinion becomes most interesting. As we ar-
gued, and as Justice Souter’s dissent makes clear, confining individualized 
sentencing to a mere requirement that a jury be allowed to consider relevant 
mitigating evidence falls short of the demand of constitutional reliability set 
forth in the Court’s own precedents. Justice Thomas acknowledges the in-
congruity by dismissing it. 
For example, in answering Justice Souter’s claim that the Kansas equi-
poise provision increases the risk of error in capital sentencing, Justice 
Thomas asserts in a footnote that the jury instruction allowing consideration 
of “mercy” as a mitigating factor “alone forecloses the possibility of 
Furman-type error” by eliminating such risk. In making the assertion, how-
ever, Justice Thomas second-guesses the Kansas Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of how its own capital-sentencing formula operates, and in 
doing so, mischaracterizes the instruction.  
In its earlier decision of State v. Kleypas, the Kansas Supreme Court au-
thoritatively interpreted the statutory equipoise formula as mandating death 
in “doubtful cases,” i.e., where the jury concludes that the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances are in equipoise. Applying constitutional princi-
ples under the Eighth Amendment, the Kansas court concluded that the 
statute violated the demands of individualized sentencing. The Kleypas 
holding was reiterated by the Kansas Supreme Court in its decision in 
Marsh.  
It was settled long ago, in cases like Winters v. New York and Poulos v. 
New Hampshire, that the Supreme Court has a duty, under principles of fed-
eralism, to accept the interpretation of a state statute by the state’s highest 
court. Yet, the only interpretation of the Kansas formula under which Justice 
Thomas’s assertion has any validity is one that assumes a Kansas jury is 
given the discretion and authority to dispense mercy after finding aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances in equipoise. Only then would the jury be 
asked to make an individualized determination whether to impose death. 
But, as interpreted by the Kansas Supreme Court, the Kansas formula ends 
with the weighing process. If the jury is in equipoise after considering ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances, the sentence must be death. By 
interpreting the Kansas formula differently than the Kansas Supreme Court, 
Justice Thomas mischaracterizes the mercy instruction. The only way a jury 
could dispense mercy under the Kansas instruction is by refusing to follow 
it. 
WOODMAN IMPRESSIONS FI PAGINATED.DOC 10/20/2006 3:50 PM 
76 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 105:73 
 
Studies done by the Capital Jury Project have shown that jurors in death 
penalty cases often seek ways to deny personal moral responsibility for their 
sentencing decision. As we documented in our brief, Kansas prosecutors 
urge jurors that, under the law, death must be the result if they cannot decide 
Justice Souter’s argument—the fact that aggravators must predominate un-
der those systems was crucial to finding them constitutional—Justice 
Thomas (again, in a footnote) merely states that both Boyde and Blystone 
turned on the idea that the formulas were not “impermissibly mandatory.” 
But under any analysis, a structure mandating death when the jury’s reasons 
for favoring death are actually greater than the reasons for sparing a defen-
dant’s life is materially different from the Kansas structure of, “If it’s a tie, 
you must die.” The majority does not answer. 
As Justice Souter reminds us, constitutional reliability under the Eighth 
Amendment “demands both form and substance, both a system for decision 
and one geared to produce morally justifiable results.” A death sentence can 
only be “morally justifiable” if, as the Eighth Amendment requires, the deci-
sion to impose death constitutes a “reasoned moral response,” which turns 
on the uniqueness of the individual and the details of the crime, and identi-
fies the defendant as one whose extreme culpability makes him or her 
particularly deserving of death. Kansas’s “tie breaker” in favor of death, 
Justice Souter explains, does none of these things. It does the opposite, be-
cause the determining fact—a finding of equipoise—is not directly linked to 
a particular crime or criminal, and reflects no evidentiary showing that death 
must be the reasoned moral response. Rather than minimize the risk of an 
erroneous death sentence as the Eighth Amendment demands, the Kansas 
statute “guarantee[s] that in equipoise cases the risk will be realized.” 
Justice Thomas maintains that it is simply “implausible” that an equi-
poise determination reflects an inability of the jury to decide between life 
and death, or that a Kansas jury would impose death by equipoise without 
making the constitutionally requisite “reasoned, moral decision” about 
whether death is an appropriate punishment. But his reasoning, as he him-
self states, is based on the claim that weighing is not an end under the 
Kansas statute, but rather, “merely a means to reaching a decision.” Again, 
this claim relies on a mischaracterization of the Kansas procedure that di-
rectly contradicts the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of how the 
statute operates. Weighing is an end under the Kansas formula; there is no 
further decision-making step. A finding of equipoise is, as Justice Souter 
states, the determining fact of death.  
Consequently, Justice Thomas’s statement that a determination of equi-
poise under the Kansas statute is a “decision for death” does nothing to 
satisfy the constitutional demands of individualized sentencing. Instead, it 
merely legitimizes what Professor Robert Weisberg, in his 1983 article, De-
regulating Death, termed a “choice to be choiceless.” That is, at the very 
point when the jury does not find the defendant more deserving of death 
than any other generic death-eligible defendant, the Kansas law decrees 
death. This is the very antithesis of the reliable, rationally reviewable capital 
sentencing decision required under the Eighth Amendment.  
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One can admit, without condoning the mistakes that do occur, and while 
striving to minimize the risk that they will occur, that even constitutional 
whether aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, 
or vice versa. The Court’s decision in Marsh encourages prosecutors to con-
tinue the practice. Under these conditions, there is great incentive for 
Kansas jurors, at the point of equipoise, to seek refuge from responsibility in 
a legal rule that chooses death for them.  
Faithfulness to an effort to harmonize the competing constitutional de-
mands of the eligibility (narrowing) and selection (individualized 
sentencing) stages of capital decision-making would have required that the 
Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh be affirmed. Instead, a majority 
of the Supreme Court appears to have retreated from the core constitutional 
demand of heightened reliability that, under the Court’s precedents, is inte-
gral to the individualized sentencing determination required under the 
Eighth Amendment.  
It is instructive that constitutional “reliability” is mentioned nowhere in 
the majority opinion. And, to the extent Justice Thomas even acknowledges 
the Court’s longstanding appreciation for the idea that death is truly “differ-
ent” from all other punishments, he then debunks the idea entirely by 
chastising Justice Souter for arguing that recent death row exonerations pro-
vide “new empirical evidence” demonstrating the difference. Justice 
Thomas claims instead that “the thrust of our mitigation jurisprudence ends” 
with the right to present evidence in mitigation and the obligation of the 
sentencer to consider that evidence. As Justice Souter notes, the Court’s 
holding “defies decades of precedent aimed at eliminating freakish capital 
sentencing in the United States.” 
The majority opinion in Marsh closes with a warning that the “logical 
consequence” of Justice Souter’s argument against the Kansas statute “is 
that the death penalty can only be just in a system that does not permit er-
ror.” This charge suggests that the dissent’s insistence on the constitutional 
demand for reliability necessarily means that the administration of the death 
penalty must be perfect. Therefore, to insist on reliability is, ipso facto, to 
call for abolition of the death penalty. It is as if Justice Thomas projected 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Callins—in which his response to the diffi-
culty of harmonizing competing constitutional demands under the Eighth 
Amendment was to cease upholding the death penalty in any case—onto 
Justice Souter’s dissent in Marsh. The problem is, Justice Souter never 
makes that argument. His argument is that the Kansas statute does not com-
port with the requirement of constitutional reliability in the determination of 
whether death is an appropriate punishment in a specific case—that, instead 
of minimizing the risk of error, it increases that risk by mandating death 
upon a finding of equipoise. In other words, the demands of individualized 
sentencing under the Eighth Amendment cannot be met. Harmonization of 
the competing constitutional demands at the eligibility and selection stages 
is impossible here, not because the demands are inherently irreconcilable, 
but because the demands indispensable to the selection decision under the 
Eighth Amendment cannot be fulfilled by the terms of the statute. 
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procedures are prone to human error. Minimizing the risk of error in capital 
sentencing has been a fundamental goal of the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence since Furman. But in Marsh, instead of enforcing constitu-
tional rules designed to minimize mistakes, a majority of the Supreme Court 
retreats from those rules. The Court legitimizes error by approving a capital 
sentencing procedure that increases the risk an individual will be sentenced 
to death when the evidence does not demonstrate that he or she deserves it. 
By its decision in Kansas v. Marsh, a majority of the Court comes peril-
ously close to the position of Justice Scalia, whose answer to the difficulty 
of harmonizing demands under the Eighth Amendment is to eliminate the 
individualized sentencing requirements from capital sentencing procedures. 
The question remaining is whether the majority’s retreat from those re-
quirements in Marsh will have any effect on future capital cases that come 
before the Court, or whether—as Justice Stevens sees it—the decision 
represents “[n]othing more than an interest in facilitating the imposition of 
the death penalty” in Kansas. Stay tuned. 
